Monday 27 December 2010
Wednesday 1 December 2010
Kings of Leon (and Castile)
Kings of Leon do not sing in Spanish. Do they sing in Castilian?
Well, in English there is no problem at all. The language spoken in Spain and the Americas is called 'Spanish'. Spain was the name of the empire (The Spanish Crown) and Spanish its language. In Spanish, however, the term 'Spanish' is quite recent since its speakers made the historical distinction about the exact extraction of that language: the Kingdom of Castile. Until the 1920s the most common term to refer to the Spanish language was castellano, that is, Castilian. In the 2009 January-June issue of the Bulletin of The Royal Spanish Academy Julio Arenas argues that the noun 'Spanish' was directly and indirectly coined by Menéndez Pidal, who tried to be more specific about the Spanish language as a philological subject. The term Castilian was wrongly used to name the language that absorbed other romance languages such as the Leonese and the Navarro-Aragonese, argued Menéndez Pidal. In other words, Castilian was the historical root of a language that incorporated other languages. Spanish is the teleological noun, that is, the noun that explains the language's purposes or objectives (its present and future), no longer its craddle (its past), which arguably is to give the language unity and identity. Following that argument, we should no longer use the noun English since that language absorbed many other languages spoken in the British isles (and many more abroad). How about the British language? No, thank you very much.
Fortunately, the speakers of English do not have a Royal Academy full of nonsense-prone gaga academics who try (to not avail of course) to rule the Castilian spoken world. If we stick to Arena's teleological argument, the language spoken in Spain and the Americas should be called the Spanish-American language. But is not called that way (I would rather call it Spanish-Columbian, since Americo Vespuci had nothing to do with the spreading of Castilian. Spanish-Macondo would do it as well). The teleological argument would imply that we should add every corner of the world where the language is being spoken or is being ferociously sold as a cultural product, the ultimate teleology of the Spanish Government and its Instituto Cervantes as far a s the Spanish language is concerned. Now let us examine the term as an adjective. What do we understand by Spanish literature? Does Spanish literature comprise the literature written in Catalan or Galician? Does it comprise the literature in Spanish written in the Americas? To be specific we have to use the term Spanish-language, that is, the literature in 'lengua española'. More inadequate nonsense. Castilian would have sufficed. Castilian literature, period. Nobody would think that it refers only to the literature written in the old Kingdom of Castile as noboby thinks that English literature refers only to the literature written in England. The French had their French language. The English, their English language. Well, the Spaniards wanted to have their Spanish language. Biutiful.
Now, the Pan-Hispanic Dictionary meant to solve doubts about the Spanish language spoken in Spain and the Americas (Castilian in brief) says about the noun Spanish:
Well, in English there is no problem at all. The language spoken in Spain and the Americas is called 'Spanish'. Spain was the name of the empire (The Spanish Crown) and Spanish its language. In Spanish, however, the term 'Spanish' is quite recent since its speakers made the historical distinction about the exact extraction of that language: the Kingdom of Castile. Until the 1920s the most common term to refer to the Spanish language was castellano, that is, Castilian. In the 2009 January-June issue of the Bulletin of The Royal Spanish Academy Julio Arenas argues that the noun 'Spanish' was directly and indirectly coined by Menéndez Pidal, who tried to be more specific about the Spanish language as a philological subject. The term Castilian was wrongly used to name the language that absorbed other romance languages such as the Leonese and the Navarro-Aragonese, argued Menéndez Pidal. In other words, Castilian was the historical root of a language that incorporated other languages. Spanish is the teleological noun, that is, the noun that explains the language's purposes or objectives (its present and future), no longer its craddle (its past), which arguably is to give the language unity and identity. Following that argument, we should no longer use the noun English since that language absorbed many other languages spoken in the British isles (and many more abroad). How about the British language? No, thank you very much.
Fortunately, the speakers of English do not have a Royal Academy full of nonsense-prone gaga academics who try (to not avail of course) to rule the Castilian spoken world. If we stick to Arena's teleological argument, the language spoken in Spain and the Americas should be called the Spanish-American language. But is not called that way (I would rather call it Spanish-Columbian, since Americo Vespuci had nothing to do with the spreading of Castilian. Spanish-Macondo would do it as well). The teleological argument would imply that we should add every corner of the world where the language is being spoken or is being ferociously sold as a cultural product, the ultimate teleology of the Spanish Government and its Instituto Cervantes as far a s the Spanish language is concerned. Now let us examine the term as an adjective. What do we understand by Spanish literature? Does Spanish literature comprise the literature written in Catalan or Galician? Does it comprise the literature in Spanish written in the Americas? To be specific we have to use the term Spanish-language, that is, the literature in 'lengua española'. More inadequate nonsense. Castilian would have sufficed. Castilian literature, period. Nobody would think that it refers only to the literature written in the old Kingdom of Castile as noboby thinks that English literature refers only to the literature written in England. The French had their French language. The English, their English language. Well, the Spaniards wanted to have their Spanish language. Biutiful.
Now, the Pan-Hispanic Dictionary meant to solve doubts about the Spanish language spoken in Spain and the Americas (Castilian in brief) says about the noun Spanish:
When naming the common language of Spain and of many American nations, which is also spoken as a first language in other parts of the world, the terms Castilian and Spanish are [both] valid. The debate on which of these designations is more appropriate is nowadays overcome. [...] Although it is a synonym of Spanish, it is preferable to keep the term Castilian to refer to the Romance dialect born in the Kingdom of Castile during the Middle Ages, or to the dialect of Spanish currently spoken in that region.
But soon afterwards the same dictionary adds that in case of talking about the official languages of Spain, is better to use the term Castilian so as to contrast Castilian or Spanish with Catalan, Galician and Basque. These guys are real or royal schizophrenics.
I stand tall alongside the old kings of Castile and Leon who ate their turkey barehanded without cutlery and drank Castile's old wine. Their language is Castilian.
Wednesday 17 November 2010
Monday 11 October 2010
Aria Adli, between generativist and socio linguistics
It has been quite a revelation. Adli's work is so uncommon. He combines generativist linguistic with sociological theory in ways I have never seen before. His study on syntactic optionality and social background based both on Chomsky's Minimalist Program syntax and Bourdieu's Distinction is extraordinary.
Check it out.
Check it out.
A cathedral that is not a cathedral
Can a cathedral still be called a cathedral if only its facade survives? The cathedral has lost all its functionality (use-value). After the bombardment it has acquired another meaning: a war memorial, an act of resiliency. An old sign signs a different object. An old sign with new meaning.
Thursday 7 October 2010
Saturday 2 October 2010
Ejercicios de estilo en la tuitósfera
por @ajescandon (salvo cuando se indique lo contrario)
(Basado en Ejercicios de estilo de Raymond Queneau)
14-September-2010
21:33:33 Me he tendido sobre la hierba, en la noche, de niña y de adulta, sobria y borracha, llorando y riendo, sola y acompañada. ORIGINAL (se lo debemos a @hierbadenoche)
21:36:02 Briznas de hierba/ astros a lo lejos/ risas y no risas/ una botella de saque//TANKA
21:40:22 Tirada en la hierba, en plan chaval, en plan tía, seca y con litrona, lágrimas y carcajadas, tío, sola y con mogollón de compañeros. PASOTA
21:57:31 Perpendicular a la hierba, en la horizontal yazgo sin desplazarme. Seno y coseno. Esférica y cuadrilátera. Punto y tangente. GEOMETRICO
21:58:13 Falsidicus in gramen, pariter a parvulus ibidem adult, rideo risi risum, tristis, siccus vel madidus, unus, constipatus per populus LATIN
22:03:26 Sola en la asquerosa hierba, a oscuras, párvula, aburrida y curada en licor de segunda, a mares llorando, desolada o en andas. INJURIOSO
22:06:59 ¿Cómo decirte que estoy sola, en la hierba, lejos de ti, a ratos madura a ratos niña? ¿Cómo expresar estos temblores etílicos? IMPOTENTE
22:10:01 En la espesura de la hierba yazgo, firmamento nocturno, pueril y adulta, sobria y embriagada, lloro y río, desolada y acompañada. AMANERADO
22:14:13 Era de noche y estaba tendida en la hierba, de niña y mujer, sobria y borracha. Era risas y lágrimas. Estaba sola y acompañada. IMPERFECTO
22:17:18 No sé qué hago en la hierba ni quién apago la luz. ¿Soy niña o mujer? ¿Estoy borracha? ¿Sobria? ¿Río o lloro? ¿Y esta gente? IGNORANCIA
22:20:12 La hierba. La duda. La noche. Niña. Adulta. Risas. Lágrimas. Dos botellas de escocés vacías. Una mujer. Más de una mujer. ANALISIS LOGICO
22:24:11 Tuit, tuit, tuit. Jajajá. -) ;-) :-( Hic, hic, hic. Cof, cof. Ehhhhhhhhhhh! ONOMATOPEYAS
22:27:56 Y qué si me tiendo en la yerba de noche, si soy niña borracha o adulta sobria, si río o si lloro. Déjame sola, mala compañía. AUTOSUFICIENTE By:SofiaLiemann
22:29:31 Sal, risa, las amé de sol ¿o ni ve? Dar eso, ir sola: abre Ihara, eh, con noche ara hierba a los ríos: era de vino, lo sé de más al asirlas. PALINDROMO By:MaelAglaia
22:46:35 Tengo la satisfacción de informar a Vd. de que me encuentro sobre la hierba y que me pasan cosas notables. Atentamente, @hierbade... OFICIAL
22:51:53 Herboyacimiento nocturno, como infantofémina en sobriotemperancia, lacrimojocosa, solitaria y turbamultosa. PALABRAS COMPUESTAS
22:59:09 A las 02:00 h. 15 m. sobre la hierba, a 5 Km. de casa, como niña de 4 y mujer de 30 años y un mes, solo quedan 120 ml. de escocés. PRECISION
23:04:25 Sobre el terso pelo del monte mecido por el céfiro nocturno, síncope de mi boca, caudales de agua o alcohol por mis ríos. METAFORA
(Basado en Ejercicios de estilo de Raymond Queneau)
14-September-2010
21:33:33 Me he tendido sobre la hierba, en la noche, de niña y de adulta, sobria y borracha, llorando y riendo, sola y acompañada. ORIGINAL (se lo debemos a @hierbadenoche)
21:36:02 Briznas de hierba/ astros a lo lejos/ risas y no risas/ una botella de saque//TANKA
21:40:22 Tirada en la hierba, en plan chaval, en plan tía, seca y con litrona, lágrimas y carcajadas, tío, sola y con mogollón de compañeros. PASOTA
21:57:31 Perpendicular a la hierba, en la horizontal yazgo sin desplazarme. Seno y coseno. Esférica y cuadrilátera. Punto y tangente. GEOMETRICO
21:58:13 Falsidicus in gramen, pariter a parvulus ibidem adult, rideo risi risum, tristis, siccus vel madidus, unus, constipatus per populus LATIN
22:03:26 Sola en la asquerosa hierba, a oscuras, párvula, aburrida y curada en licor de segunda, a mares llorando, desolada o en andas. INJURIOSO
22:06:59 ¿Cómo decirte que estoy sola, en la hierba, lejos de ti, a ratos madura a ratos niña? ¿Cómo expresar estos temblores etílicos? IMPOTENTE
22:10:01 En la espesura de la hierba yazgo, firmamento nocturno, pueril y adulta, sobria y embriagada, lloro y río, desolada y acompañada. AMANERADO
22:14:13 Era de noche y estaba tendida en la hierba, de niña y mujer, sobria y borracha. Era risas y lágrimas. Estaba sola y acompañada. IMPERFECTO
22:17:18 No sé qué hago en la hierba ni quién apago la luz. ¿Soy niña o mujer? ¿Estoy borracha? ¿Sobria? ¿Río o lloro? ¿Y esta gente? IGNORANCIA
22:20:12 La hierba. La duda. La noche. Niña. Adulta. Risas. Lágrimas. Dos botellas de escocés vacías. Una mujer. Más de una mujer. ANALISIS LOGICO
22:24:11 Tuit, tuit, tuit. Jajajá. -) ;-) :-( Hic, hic, hic. Cof, cof. Ehhhhhhhhhhh! ONOMATOPEYAS
22:27:56 Y qué si me tiendo en la yerba de noche, si soy niña borracha o adulta sobria, si río o si lloro. Déjame sola, mala compañía. AUTOSUFICIENTE By:SofiaLiemann
22:29:31 Sal, risa, las amé de sol ¿o ni ve? Dar eso, ir sola: abre Ihara, eh, con noche ara hierba a los ríos: era de vino, lo sé de más al asirlas. PALINDROMO By:MaelAglaia
22:46:35 Tengo la satisfacción de informar a Vd. de que me encuentro sobre la hierba y que me pasan cosas notables. Atentamente, @hierbade... OFICIAL
22:51:53 Herboyacimiento nocturno, como infantofémina en sobriotemperancia, lacrimojocosa, solitaria y turbamultosa. PALABRAS COMPUESTAS
22:59:09 A las 02:00 h. 15 m. sobre la hierba, a 5 Km. de casa, como niña de 4 y mujer de 30 años y un mes, solo quedan 120 ml. de escocés. PRECISION
23:04:25 Sobre el terso pelo del monte mecido por el céfiro nocturno, síncope de mi boca, caudales de agua o alcohol por mis ríos. METAFORA
Marlon Brando en Malibu
Twitterficción por @ajescandon
19:36:25 Bésame, Larry. Y Marlon Brando se va encima de Larry King y sus patéticas gafas de marco grueso. Los cámaras casi vomitan.
19:40:10 Fuera del estudio, Sunset Boulevard. Brando se mete como puede en un coche negro y huye hacia Malibu en medio de los destellos. Flash.
19:42:45 Por el parabrisas desfilan, borrosas, prostitutas, palmeras californianas, hombres agazapados debajo de un sombrero tejano, luces.
19:44:14 Es medianoche y Brando abre la ventanilla del deportivo. Respira hondo y el aire salado del Pacífico se mete en los pulmones reventados.
19:45:57 "Mientras más sensible, más te flagelan; no debes sentir nada, vuélvete de piedra". "Pero y si me vuelvo psicópata", piensa Brando.
19:47:19 "El puto de Larry sabía a besugo", piensa Brando mientras pisa el acelerador a fondo. Los Ángeles va quedando atrás...
19:49:56 Y ese panal de luces que es Los Ángeles se refleja en el retrovisor. Brando ve dos figuras negras en la acera a media milla de distancia.
19:52:12 Como resabios remotos del animal de caza que fue, siente la erección que apenas se desborda, la suave crispación de la piel.
19:53:51 Brando pisa el freno. "Sois putos, verdaderos putos", musita. Las dos figuras esqueléticas recauchadas en silicona entran en el coche.
19:55:59 "Cómo es que os llamáis, selvanegras, cómo es que os conocen por estos cortijos", pregunta mientras enciende un cigarrillo.
19:58:46 Yo, "David", dice una. "Yo, Bowie", dice la otra. Brando esboza la sonrisa del rey de la moto. Hunde los ojos en la memoria.
20:00:42 Todo huele a cama en el deportivo. Anticipación de sábanas, anticipación de lámparas cenitales. Entrega. Brando empieza a cantar.
20:07:15 Brando mira por el rabillo del ojo a David y se percata de unas piernas envueltas en una malla negra. "Cuánta decadencia", piensa.
20:18:34 David tiene algo de Stella Adler, algo impreciso que no sabe bien qué. Bowie, en el asiento trasero, comienza a percatarse.
21:19:41 Brando pone su manota derecha en el jamón de David repasando la malla. "Has visto Don Juan de Marco, cariño", pregunta.
21:22:20 David se ríe. "Adónde nos llevas, gordinflón de mierda", pregunta Bowie, que se empieza a mosquear al no participar de la acción.
21:27:18 "Has dibujado alguna vez pentagramas en la arena, Bowie", pregunta Brando. "Jamás", le responde. "Vamos a Malibu".
21:29:54 Brando estaciona el coche cerca del walkboard. Antes de bajarse, Bowie se coloca una línea que había desplegado en el muslo.
21:32:29 "Os voy a remover la silicona, selvanegras", exclama Brando riéndose a carcajadas. "Puede que hasta volvamos a Tahiti en el Bounty".
21:35:14 David cuchichea algo con Bowie: "Pero si este degenerado tiene la pinta de ser Marlon Brando". “Ya no le queda cintura", dice David.
21:37:26 Como para cebar aún más la tripa cervecera, Brando saca una java del maletero. "Princesas, ayudadme con las birras".
21:40:14 Se alejan del aparcamiento y las luces del camino costero. Brando apenas puede caminar con la java de cervezas que le aplasta los huevos.
21:43:05 Brando se echa en la arena. David y Bowie se lanzan encima y le corren mano. "No tan rápido, gárgolas putrefactas. Bebamos unas birras".
21:44:57 Los tres miran las estrellas tumbados boca arriba. El rumor de las olas no es real. Es la banda sonora de una película de Brando.
21:48:48 Brando se palpa los bolsillos de los vaqueros hasta dar con el abridor. "Un poco más joven y me los follo antes de las birras", piensa.
21:53:38 "En verdad eres Marlon Brando, gordinflón", pregunta Bowie. "Ya no exudas ni el ángel ni el garbo de Brando, puto impostor", exclama David.
21:55:35 "Capullos", exclama. Entonces Brando comienza a recitar parlamentos enteros de "On the Waterfront", como si rezara en una catedral gótica.
21:59:39 "Come on, drink up. You got to get a little fun out of life. Come on. I'll stick some music on. What's the matter with you?”
22:03:35 Y el puto Brando, vuelve a Adler, vuelve a Stanislavski, regresa en cuerpo y alma y declama las líneas de "On the Waterfront" como poseído.
22:05:37 Su culo está en la arena de Malibu, pero su mente, en los estudios, en 1954. Incluso puede ver a Kazan, el director, detrás del cámara.
22:07:44 Entonces Bowie, con el culo de travesti enterrado en la arena, comprende y le responde, como en un ritual de vudú: "Edie, I'd like to help".
22:10:21 "Edie, I'd like to help. I'd like to help, but there's nothing I can do", repite Bowie. Y Brando vuelve, vuelve a las cábalas y se palpa.
22:12:25 Es la marca de Brando, tocarse los huevos. Con los ojos puestos en el firmamento, puerto de su memoria, Brando continúa el diálogo.
22:15:15 "All right. I shouldn't have asked you. Edie, come on. Have a little beer. Come on". Y Bowie rechaza la botella que Brando le acerca.
22:17:09 David está de rodillas y comienza a quitarle los zapatos a Brando, quien sigue con los ojos puestos en las estrellas declamando el guión.
22:21:03 "No quiero beber. Quédate aquí y termina la cerveza", responde Bowie, que comienza a desabrochar la camisa de Brando.
22:23:26 Brando ni se ha enterado del trabajo carroñero de las gárgolas. "No te vayas. Tengo todo el resto de mi vida para beber", responde Brando.
22:25:47 Brando ha quedado completamente en cueros, tumbado boca arriba en la arena, mirando las estrellas en la playa de Malibu.
22:31:55 Ha dejado de declamar. La mano roza los labios. "Qué es ser un perdedor; personaje de película o de la vida real", se pregunta.
22:33:56 David y Bowie se suben en el deportivo de Brando y comienzan a besarse como putas salvajes.
22:37:06 Brando bebe a sorbos cortos y con la izquierda se toca los huevos.
22:38:50 Un poco más allá, arranca un deportivo negro y se pierde en la claridad de las luces del walkboard de Malibu.
22:39:55 "He ganado perder; he perdido ganar", piensa Brando y hunde la nuca en la arena para seguir contemplando la bóveda celeste.
22:40:05 THE END
19:36:25 Bésame, Larry. Y Marlon Brando se va encima de Larry King y sus patéticas gafas de marco grueso. Los cámaras casi vomitan.
19:40:10 Fuera del estudio, Sunset Boulevard. Brando se mete como puede en un coche negro y huye hacia Malibu en medio de los destellos. Flash.
19:42:45 Por el parabrisas desfilan, borrosas, prostitutas, palmeras californianas, hombres agazapados debajo de un sombrero tejano, luces.
19:44:14 Es medianoche y Brando abre la ventanilla del deportivo. Respira hondo y el aire salado del Pacífico se mete en los pulmones reventados.
19:45:57 "Mientras más sensible, más te flagelan; no debes sentir nada, vuélvete de piedra". "Pero y si me vuelvo psicópata", piensa Brando.
19:47:19 "El puto de Larry sabía a besugo", piensa Brando mientras pisa el acelerador a fondo. Los Ángeles va quedando atrás...
19:49:56 Y ese panal de luces que es Los Ángeles se refleja en el retrovisor. Brando ve dos figuras negras en la acera a media milla de distancia.
19:52:12 Como resabios remotos del animal de caza que fue, siente la erección que apenas se desborda, la suave crispación de la piel.
19:53:51 Brando pisa el freno. "Sois putos, verdaderos putos", musita. Las dos figuras esqueléticas recauchadas en silicona entran en el coche.
19:55:59 "Cómo es que os llamáis, selvanegras, cómo es que os conocen por estos cortijos", pregunta mientras enciende un cigarrillo.
19:58:46 Yo, "David", dice una. "Yo, Bowie", dice la otra. Brando esboza la sonrisa del rey de la moto. Hunde los ojos en la memoria.
20:00:42 Todo huele a cama en el deportivo. Anticipación de sábanas, anticipación de lámparas cenitales. Entrega. Brando empieza a cantar.
20:07:15 Brando mira por el rabillo del ojo a David y se percata de unas piernas envueltas en una malla negra. "Cuánta decadencia", piensa.
20:18:34 David tiene algo de Stella Adler, algo impreciso que no sabe bien qué. Bowie, en el asiento trasero, comienza a percatarse.
21:19:41 Brando pone su manota derecha en el jamón de David repasando la malla. "Has visto Don Juan de Marco, cariño", pregunta.
21:22:20 David se ríe. "Adónde nos llevas, gordinflón de mierda", pregunta Bowie, que se empieza a mosquear al no participar de la acción.
21:27:18 "Has dibujado alguna vez pentagramas en la arena, Bowie", pregunta Brando. "Jamás", le responde. "Vamos a Malibu".
21:29:54 Brando estaciona el coche cerca del walkboard. Antes de bajarse, Bowie se coloca una línea que había desplegado en el muslo.
21:32:29 "Os voy a remover la silicona, selvanegras", exclama Brando riéndose a carcajadas. "Puede que hasta volvamos a Tahiti en el Bounty".
21:35:14 David cuchichea algo con Bowie: "Pero si este degenerado tiene la pinta de ser Marlon Brando". “Ya no le queda cintura", dice David.
21:37:26 Como para cebar aún más la tripa cervecera, Brando saca una java del maletero. "Princesas, ayudadme con las birras".
21:40:14 Se alejan del aparcamiento y las luces del camino costero. Brando apenas puede caminar con la java de cervezas que le aplasta los huevos.
21:43:05 Brando se echa en la arena. David y Bowie se lanzan encima y le corren mano. "No tan rápido, gárgolas putrefactas. Bebamos unas birras".
21:44:57 Los tres miran las estrellas tumbados boca arriba. El rumor de las olas no es real. Es la banda sonora de una película de Brando.
21:48:48 Brando se palpa los bolsillos de los vaqueros hasta dar con el abridor. "Un poco más joven y me los follo antes de las birras", piensa.
21:53:38 "En verdad eres Marlon Brando, gordinflón", pregunta Bowie. "Ya no exudas ni el ángel ni el garbo de Brando, puto impostor", exclama David.
21:55:35 "Capullos", exclama. Entonces Brando comienza a recitar parlamentos enteros de "On the Waterfront", como si rezara en una catedral gótica.
21:59:39 "Come on, drink up. You got to get a little fun out of life. Come on. I'll stick some music on. What's the matter with you?”
22:03:35 Y el puto Brando, vuelve a Adler, vuelve a Stanislavski, regresa en cuerpo y alma y declama las líneas de "On the Waterfront" como poseído.
22:05:37 Su culo está en la arena de Malibu, pero su mente, en los estudios, en 1954. Incluso puede ver a Kazan, el director, detrás del cámara.
22:07:44 Entonces Bowie, con el culo de travesti enterrado en la arena, comprende y le responde, como en un ritual de vudú: "Edie, I'd like to help".
22:10:21 "Edie, I'd like to help. I'd like to help, but there's nothing I can do", repite Bowie. Y Brando vuelve, vuelve a las cábalas y se palpa.
22:12:25 Es la marca de Brando, tocarse los huevos. Con los ojos puestos en el firmamento, puerto de su memoria, Brando continúa el diálogo.
22:15:15 "All right. I shouldn't have asked you. Edie, come on. Have a little beer. Come on". Y Bowie rechaza la botella que Brando le acerca.
22:17:09 David está de rodillas y comienza a quitarle los zapatos a Brando, quien sigue con los ojos puestos en las estrellas declamando el guión.
22:21:03 "No quiero beber. Quédate aquí y termina la cerveza", responde Bowie, que comienza a desabrochar la camisa de Brando.
22:23:26 Brando ni se ha enterado del trabajo carroñero de las gárgolas. "No te vayas. Tengo todo el resto de mi vida para beber", responde Brando.
22:25:47 Brando ha quedado completamente en cueros, tumbado boca arriba en la arena, mirando las estrellas en la playa de Malibu.
22:31:55 Ha dejado de declamar. La mano roza los labios. "Qué es ser un perdedor; personaje de película o de la vida real", se pregunta.
22:33:56 David y Bowie se suben en el deportivo de Brando y comienzan a besarse como putas salvajes.
22:37:06 Brando bebe a sorbos cortos y con la izquierda se toca los huevos.
22:38:50 Un poco más allá, arranca un deportivo negro y se pierde en la claridad de las luces del walkboard de Malibu.
22:39:55 "He ganado perder; he perdido ganar", piensa Brando y hunde la nuca en la arena para seguir contemplando la bóveda celeste.
22:40:05 THE END
Thursday 30 September 2010
Activity, its units, components, levels and structure
There has been some concern about the use of the term 'level' in the video on Agency and Vygotskyan theory that I uploaded a week ago (video). This concern is not new and doesn't involve only the term 'level' but the terms 'unit', 'component' and 'hierarchy'.
By levels I meant levels of analysis. I don't see those levels as building blocks, since I established the connection between the individual action-goal (or action-motive, with especial attention to a plan to use concrete resources) and the object/motive of the activity. Thus, as Leontyev points out, sense or personal meaning is the relationship (I used the word 'distance') between motive and goal.
'Level' and 'unit' are examples of a bad choice of words, but Leontyev also faced the same problem. He is always writing about 'units' or 'components', always between quotation marks.
I believe that he is referring to a level of analysis, not that one can actually take an activity and action or an operation as not being present at once. AA Leontyev later clarified this and came up with the term 'formation'. But he kind of erased the view of the structure of activity that his father had advanced. Obviously an analytical tool was reified. That happens all the time when the use of certain instruments of analysis gets operationalised (I am thinking about the use of questionnaires and questionnaire analysis in social research for instance).
Well, activity is the Universal. It's abstract. So just replace 'level' by 'moment' of the Notion. Would that make it?
But it is not my fault Leontyev used the words 'unit', 'component', 'structure' and, yes, 'hierarchy' (a horrible word isn't it?, but Leontyev actually used it). Obviously the structure refers to moments of a single unit, not about a hierarchical structure such as a scaffold where you can't place level three without building levels 1 and 2.
Blunden (2010) uses 'anatomy' and 'taxonomy' in his comprehensive 'Interdisciplinary concept of activity'. He even uses the word hierarchy, but that does not mean he believes one is higher than the other. I believe he is seeing it in terms of what is external and internal, or the link there is between the subject and the object, but of course everything is happening at once.
In general, I miss the idea of activity systems within activity systems. As is the case with the notion of communities of practice, I see the enactment of pedagogical methods by instructors almost as activity systems in themselves (like systems operating embedded in other system-- a labour union within a given company, for instance).
It's like if groups of instructors belonged to a certain collective that carries with it certain modus operandi. Different alliances are created outside the activity system. When teaching a foreign language, teachers seem to activate certain ways of doing things which are not necessarily explained by the institutional object. But if you attend the conferences they attend you can clearly see that affiliations not necessarily pass through contractual schemes. They may be doing something contrary to the institution's object, yet they are part and parcel of the activity system (I remember a priest using his language class to proselytise). What is missing in activity theory is a theory of identity, especially in post-modern times. Times dominated by decentralised pedagogic identities, as Basil Bernstein would say.
About units, structure, components and hierarchy. Textual sources.
"Being, the life of each individual is made up of the sum-total or, to be more exact, a system, a hierarchy of successive activities. It is in activity that the transition or 'translation' of the reflected object into the subjective image, into the ideal, takes place; at the same time it is also in activity that the transition is achieved from the ideal into activity's objective results, its products, into the material". (p. 181)
Reference: Activity and consciousness: Leontyev, A.N. (1977) Activity and consciousness. In Philosophy in the USSR: Problems of dialectical materialism. Moscow: Progress Publishers
'The General Structure of Activity' (p. 58)
"The fact that the macrostructure of external, practical activity shares certain features with that of internal, theoretical activity allows us to make an initial analysis of activity without regard to the form in which it appears". (p.59)
"The basic 'components' of various human activities are the actions that translate them into reality". (p.59)
"The selection of goal-directed actions as the components of concrete activities naturally raises the question of how these components are internally connected. As we have already mentioned, activity is not an additive process. Likewise, actions are not the special 'parts' that constitute activity. Human activity exist only in the form of an action or a chain of actions". (p. 61)
"At the same time, an activity and an action are genuinely different realities, which therefore do not coincide". (p. 61)
"In connection with selecting the concept of an action as the most important 'component' of human activity, we must keep in mind that any kind of well-developed activity presupposes the attainment of a series of concrete goals, some of which are rigidly ordered. In this process it is characteristic that for higher levels of development, the overall goal functions to realize a conscious motive, which is converted into a motive-goal precisely because it is conscious". (p. 61)
"These 'units' of human activity from its macrostructure. An important feature of the analysis that leads to distinguishing these units is that it does not rely on separating living activity into elements. Rather, it reveals the inner relations that characterize activity". (p. 65)
"It is precisely analysis of the inner, systematic connections that is needed in the investigation of activity. Without this we cannot resolve even the simplest problems, such as deciding in a given case whether we have an action or an operation". (p.65)
"The mobility of the various 'units' of the system of activity is expressed by the fact that each of them can become more fractional or, conversely, can embrace units that formerly were relatively independent". (p. 65)
Reference: Leontiev, A.N. (1981) The problem of activity in psychology. In J.V. Wertsch (Ed.), The concept of activity in Soviet psychology. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe
By levels I meant levels of analysis. I don't see those levels as building blocks, since I established the connection between the individual action-goal (or action-motive, with especial attention to a plan to use concrete resources) and the object/motive of the activity. Thus, as Leontyev points out, sense or personal meaning is the relationship (I used the word 'distance') between motive and goal.
'Level' and 'unit' are examples of a bad choice of words, but Leontyev also faced the same problem. He is always writing about 'units' or 'components', always between quotation marks.
I believe that he is referring to a level of analysis, not that one can actually take an activity and action or an operation as not being present at once. AA Leontyev later clarified this and came up with the term 'formation'. But he kind of erased the view of the structure of activity that his father had advanced. Obviously an analytical tool was reified. That happens all the time when the use of certain instruments of analysis gets operationalised (I am thinking about the use of questionnaires and questionnaire analysis in social research for instance).
Well, activity is the Universal. It's abstract. So just replace 'level' by 'moment' of the Notion. Would that make it?
But it is not my fault Leontyev used the words 'unit', 'component', 'structure' and, yes, 'hierarchy' (a horrible word isn't it?, but Leontyev actually used it). Obviously the structure refers to moments of a single unit, not about a hierarchical structure such as a scaffold where you can't place level three without building levels 1 and 2.
Blunden (2010) uses 'anatomy' and 'taxonomy' in his comprehensive 'Interdisciplinary concept of activity'. He even uses the word hierarchy, but that does not mean he believes one is higher than the other. I believe he is seeing it in terms of what is external and internal, or the link there is between the subject and the object, but of course everything is happening at once.
In general, I miss the idea of activity systems within activity systems. As is the case with the notion of communities of practice, I see the enactment of pedagogical methods by instructors almost as activity systems in themselves (like systems operating embedded in other system-- a labour union within a given company, for instance).
It's like if groups of instructors belonged to a certain collective that carries with it certain modus operandi. Different alliances are created outside the activity system. When teaching a foreign language, teachers seem to activate certain ways of doing things which are not necessarily explained by the institutional object. But if you attend the conferences they attend you can clearly see that affiliations not necessarily pass through contractual schemes. They may be doing something contrary to the institution's object, yet they are part and parcel of the activity system (I remember a priest using his language class to proselytise). What is missing in activity theory is a theory of identity, especially in post-modern times. Times dominated by decentralised pedagogic identities, as Basil Bernstein would say.
About units, structure, components and hierarchy. Textual sources.
"Being, the life of each individual is made up of the sum-total or, to be more exact, a system, a hierarchy of successive activities. It is in activity that the transition or 'translation' of the reflected object into the subjective image, into the ideal, takes place; at the same time it is also in activity that the transition is achieved from the ideal into activity's objective results, its products, into the material". (p. 181)
Reference: Activity and consciousness: Leontyev, A.N. (1977) Activity and consciousness. In Philosophy in the USSR: Problems of dialectical materialism. Moscow: Progress Publishers
'The General Structure of Activity' (p. 58)
"The fact that the macrostructure of external, practical activity shares certain features with that of internal, theoretical activity allows us to make an initial analysis of activity without regard to the form in which it appears". (p.59)
"The basic 'components' of various human activities are the actions that translate them into reality". (p.59)
"The selection of goal-directed actions as the components of concrete activities naturally raises the question of how these components are internally connected. As we have already mentioned, activity is not an additive process. Likewise, actions are not the special 'parts' that constitute activity. Human activity exist only in the form of an action or a chain of actions". (p. 61)
"At the same time, an activity and an action are genuinely different realities, which therefore do not coincide". (p. 61)
"In connection with selecting the concept of an action as the most important 'component' of human activity, we must keep in mind that any kind of well-developed activity presupposes the attainment of a series of concrete goals, some of which are rigidly ordered. In this process it is characteristic that for higher levels of development, the overall goal functions to realize a conscious motive, which is converted into a motive-goal precisely because it is conscious". (p. 61)
"These 'units' of human activity from its macrostructure. An important feature of the analysis that leads to distinguishing these units is that it does not rely on separating living activity into elements. Rather, it reveals the inner relations that characterize activity". (p. 65)
"It is precisely analysis of the inner, systematic connections that is needed in the investigation of activity. Without this we cannot resolve even the simplest problems, such as deciding in a given case whether we have an action or an operation". (p.65)
"The mobility of the various 'units' of the system of activity is expressed by the fact that each of them can become more fractional or, conversely, can embrace units that formerly were relatively independent". (p. 65)
Reference: Leontiev, A.N. (1981) The problem of activity in psychology. In J.V. Wertsch (Ed.), The concept of activity in Soviet psychology. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe
Thursday 23 September 2010
Tuesday 7 September 2010
How Chomsky got Saussure wrong
This is a remarkable paragraph contained in Roy Harris' book Saussure and his interpreters. One that can summarise precisely the difference between Chomsky's brand of structuralism and Saussure's one:
It is not in following the rules of chess that the players display any creativity: it is in using the rules to contrive situations on the board that open up opportunities for them and cause problems for their opponents--a quite different matter, and one of chess parole, not of chess langue. (Harris, 2001, p. 155)
Monday 30 August 2010
Saussure: A Hegelian going stray
When I studied Saussurean linguistics, the commonly held view was that the Course laid the foundations of structuralism. Much emphasis was put onto the dualism langue-parole (language-utterance) and therefore, one seemed to ignore the fact that Saussure set the basis of his semiology on the triad langue-langage-parole. Of course, Saussure, at the beginning of the Course, is set to look for the subject matter of a science of language and the distinctions he makes among language, human speech and speaking are made in order to justify the chosen subject of linguistics, i.e. language. And the subject matter of linguistics is, for Saussure, the most stable part of the triad, the passive collection of the conventions adopted by society that enable individuals to exercise the faculty of speech. Thank you very much.
A closer and more careful examination of the triad makes me believe Saussure is establishing a Hegelian distinction among the universal (langue), the particular (langage) and the individual (parole). 'Speech has both an individual and a social side, and we cannot conceive of one without the other' (p. 4). Furthermore, one cannot help but think on further Hegelian influence in Saussure. Let us have a look.
First, let us ponder Hegel's assertion that philosophy is distinguished from the other sciences in that it alone can presuppose neither its object nor is method. Philosophy, for Hegel, starts with a subjective presupposition. Philosophy, unlike other sciences, cannot make a clear start. Its quest for detaching from representations and dealing with notions that are severed from them is an impossible one because notions (unlike Kant's belief) are not a given, they are historically constructed (i.e. they are subjective). Philosophy, for Hegel, is circular. Now, let us have a look at the following reflection written by Saussure in the Course: 'Other sciences work with objects that are given in advance and that can then be considered from different viewpoints; but not linguistics. Someone pronounces the French word nu 'bare': a superficial observer would be tempted to call the word a concrete linguistic object; but a more careful examination would reveal successively three or four quite different things, depending on whether the word is considered as a sound, as the expression of an idea, as the equivalent of Latin nudum, etc. Far from it being the object that antedates the viewpoint, it would seem that it is the viewpoint that creates the object' (p. 8).
So what is the departing point that cuts up Hegel's approach toward philosophy from Saussure's approach toward a science of signs? The answer may lie on the chosen part of the triad. What Saussure does when he points out the universal is the subject of a science of the life of signs in society is severing from it the particular and the individual. For Hegel, in contrast, there cannot be universal without the individual instantiation.
It is all very well said, of course, but the task is horrifyingly difficult. The problem arises when one tries to keep the three moments of the notion (universal, particular, individual) together throughout research only to discover that the exercise has gone stray, becoming an unintended exercise in reification (the researcher is, after all, looking forward to achieving a higher level of generalisation) or it is so grounded that no generalisation is possible: The conclusions of research only apply to the individual case.
A closer and more careful examination of the triad makes me believe Saussure is establishing a Hegelian distinction among the universal (langue), the particular (langage) and the individual (parole). 'Speech has both an individual and a social side, and we cannot conceive of one without the other' (p. 4). Furthermore, one cannot help but think on further Hegelian influence in Saussure. Let us have a look.
First, let us ponder Hegel's assertion that philosophy is distinguished from the other sciences in that it alone can presuppose neither its object nor is method. Philosophy, for Hegel, starts with a subjective presupposition. Philosophy, unlike other sciences, cannot make a clear start. Its quest for detaching from representations and dealing with notions that are severed from them is an impossible one because notions (unlike Kant's belief) are not a given, they are historically constructed (i.e. they are subjective). Philosophy, for Hegel, is circular. Now, let us have a look at the following reflection written by Saussure in the Course: 'Other sciences work with objects that are given in advance and that can then be considered from different viewpoints; but not linguistics. Someone pronounces the French word nu 'bare': a superficial observer would be tempted to call the word a concrete linguistic object; but a more careful examination would reveal successively three or four quite different things, depending on whether the word is considered as a sound, as the expression of an idea, as the equivalent of Latin nudum, etc. Far from it being the object that antedates the viewpoint, it would seem that it is the viewpoint that creates the object' (p. 8).
So what is the departing point that cuts up Hegel's approach toward philosophy from Saussure's approach toward a science of signs? The answer may lie on the chosen part of the triad. What Saussure does when he points out the universal is the subject of a science of the life of signs in society is severing from it the particular and the individual. For Hegel, in contrast, there cannot be universal without the individual instantiation.
It is all very well said, of course, but the task is horrifyingly difficult. The problem arises when one tries to keep the three moments of the notion (universal, particular, individual) together throughout research only to discover that the exercise has gone stray, becoming an unintended exercise in reification (the researcher is, after all, looking forward to achieving a higher level of generalisation) or it is so grounded that no generalisation is possible: The conclusions of research only apply to the individual case.
Sunday 22 August 2010
Aichi Triennale 2010, contemporary corporate circus?
Too much money in Aichi and so few venues where to show it off. This Japanese prefecture is home to car manufacture powerhouse Toyota Motor Corp and although the Japanese economy continues its programmed downfall, the prefecture has been growing steadily instead.Well, prefecture officials have been busy formulating a plan to give culture depth to the prefecture's capital, Nagoya, sometimes dubbed Japan's Detroit. And Nagoya is a newly rich in the world's neighbourhood. Lots of money but no style. They organised the World Expo in 2005 but for all the money they spent--including building an international airport mostly with flights to international destinations like Tokyo--, they could not get a title of nobility. Nor the skyscrapers that populate the area near Nagoya Station can break away with the city's humble origin. Their bet this time: to gather artists from all over the world, especially from Asia and put together a Triennale. Besides, they could use art to educate the people of the prefecture by not only having them as public and somehow absorb knowledge but as producers of art.
They may have partially succeeded, if one is to judge the enterprise by the number of people cueing to get into the Triennale venue and all the projects the prefecture officials have organised at grass root community level, including primary and secondary school projects and the involvement of tertiary educational organisations engaged in arts education. But at the same time it was worrying to see that most of the public on Sunday--the second day of the Triennale--was on the streets of the city centre watching the typical Japanese end-of-summer parade, a waterdown carnival whose purpose seems to give the working class population of the city the opportunity to earn a few bucks by installing street stands and selling junk food, like in olden times. Besides, most of the participants march like a paramilitary army. No excesses are committed here. The parades work like Swiss wristwatches. Japan is not Rio de Janeiro.
Also worrying is the link established between artists and industry. Few Japanese artists enjoy wide recognition and celebrity status. One could expect a detached view of Japanese affairs from such an artist, especially when they can keep certain economic independence. It's troublesome that one of the few who does enjoy public recognition in Japan, Yayoi Kusama, designed together with Toyota the Polka-dot car. The artist, who defines herself as an 'avant-guard artist' in the welcoming message of the Aichi Triennale just made a joke of herself.
The question that rises here is precisely about this link between the corporate world and the arts at large. When the arts look more and more like the space where commodities are produced who are the artists who joined Kusama and made a joke of themselves? One would expect some sense of independence. At least a simile of independence (which would add value to the commodity by the way).
After a quick review of the exhibition entitled 'Arts and cities' one cannot help but start associating art with the awesome world of circus, the Roman entertainment designed to alienate the city population. Bread and circus, that was all what Romans cared about the city state of affairs. Few works from this exhibition actually have enough social depth to be instruments of reflection. It is not as if one would expect the artist and his or her work aligning with some sense of morality but what perspires here is the thought that many artists just made their works with a unique idea on mind: to entertain (and cheaply). True art reveals itself as well, no matter how well orchestrated is the intention to cast a screen of smoke in front of the public eye. But the uniformity of contemporary art grouped under the 'entertain or fail' motto is worrisome and profoundly boring (beautiful paradox). It's like seeing a thousand-time reproduction of the paycheck received by pop clown Andy Warhol reproduced thousand times.
Yet, art is measured by art's own measure. And there are a few sparks in Aichi Triennale 2010.
Sunday 18 July 2010
Japan's national catholicism
What can the interpretation of a text tell us about the society in which the process of interpretation takes place? That's seems to be the basic idea behind Heidegger's hermeneutic circle. What the hermeneutic circle can tell us of a society in which the original text is hidden from its members as it is the case with Japanese society?
Weber's comparison of the Protestant and Catholic faiths starts with the problem of interpreting "the text", the Bible, in this case. In the former, the text is interpreted directly by the members of the cult. In the latter, the text is mediated through the interpretation of the Church, especially through its Catechism. Thus, Weber correlates Protestant hermeneutics to a strong sense of entrepreneurship and pro-action condensed in the Protestant ethics; whereas Catholic hermeneutics has its correlate in a patriarchal situation where the member of the cult adopts a passive attitude towards the organisation of labour. Everything is received. Furthermore, everything is received in piecemeal fashion. There cannot be insightful appreciation of theoretical cohesiveness. The recipients of the readings cannot but have faith in the interpretation they are been given because the interpretation is fragmented.
These two ways of being have enormous implications in the concept of citizenship and organisation of civil society.
So let us take a quick look at Japan, where the school system systematically hides the original text. There is a complete lack of access to the manuscript, to the original work throughout the school experience. Pupils rarely face the original novel, work of History or essay. There is an abundance of cathechism and a lack of personal research and understanding. Texts are interpreted in textbooks in similar fashion to the interpretation of the Bible done by the Catholic Church in 18th and 19th Century Europe. A professor in a Japanese university told me once that it took a serious effort trying to bridge students' ability to read from the simple reading of second or third-hand interpretations to the ability to read a text in its original form.
If we look at the phenomenon from a Bernsteinian perspective, we can see that in the case where the original text is hidden, the possibilities for the recontextualisation of knowledge --a routine operation carried out by what Bernstein calls the pedagogic device-- are wider. However, in a society where the reading of the original text is virtue, the possibilities for recontextualisation are narrower. In the former case, the power lies with the mediational organisation (intrinsic power). In the latter, the power still lies with the mediational organisation but some power remains in the ideas offered in the original text (extrinsic power). The only way to check the mediators and their intentions is by having access to the original text. In a society where the original text is kept outside the public domain, it is impossible to check the accuracy and object of the mediation. You have to trust the mediation is sound. You ought to have faith in the authorities.
Weber's comparison of the Protestant and Catholic faiths starts with the problem of interpreting "the text", the Bible, in this case. In the former, the text is interpreted directly by the members of the cult. In the latter, the text is mediated through the interpretation of the Church, especially through its Catechism. Thus, Weber correlates Protestant hermeneutics to a strong sense of entrepreneurship and pro-action condensed in the Protestant ethics; whereas Catholic hermeneutics has its correlate in a patriarchal situation where the member of the cult adopts a passive attitude towards the organisation of labour. Everything is received. Furthermore, everything is received in piecemeal fashion. There cannot be insightful appreciation of theoretical cohesiveness. The recipients of the readings cannot but have faith in the interpretation they are been given because the interpretation is fragmented.
These two ways of being have enormous implications in the concept of citizenship and organisation of civil society.
So let us take a quick look at Japan, where the school system systematically hides the original text. There is a complete lack of access to the manuscript, to the original work throughout the school experience. Pupils rarely face the original novel, work of History or essay. There is an abundance of cathechism and a lack of personal research and understanding. Texts are interpreted in textbooks in similar fashion to the interpretation of the Bible done by the Catholic Church in 18th and 19th Century Europe. A professor in a Japanese university told me once that it took a serious effort trying to bridge students' ability to read from the simple reading of second or third-hand interpretations to the ability to read a text in its original form.
If we look at the phenomenon from a Bernsteinian perspective, we can see that in the case where the original text is hidden, the possibilities for the recontextualisation of knowledge --a routine operation carried out by what Bernstein calls the pedagogic device-- are wider. However, in a society where the reading of the original text is virtue, the possibilities for recontextualisation are narrower. In the former case, the power lies with the mediational organisation (intrinsic power). In the latter, the power still lies with the mediational organisation but some power remains in the ideas offered in the original text (extrinsic power). The only way to check the mediators and their intentions is by having access to the original text. In a society where the original text is kept outside the public domain, it is impossible to check the accuracy and object of the mediation. You have to trust the mediation is sound. You ought to have faith in the authorities.
Thursday 8 July 2010
Social consciousness in Japan
A Japanese writer tells a story about her being racially profiled by the police for being tall and having dark skin.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/opinion/08iht-edkumiko.html
She believes there is no word in Japanese for "racial profiling". Two days ago I spent 10 minutes explaining the term "affirmative action". One of the missions of the Japanese education system seems to be to avoid such terms. I remember the Ministry of Education skimming an English textbook lesson based on gender issues in the film "The whale rider" so as not having students discussing the gender issues contained in the film. What kind of consciousness does have a Japanese person who can read western newspapers and engage in civil rights issues?
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/opinion/08iht-edkumiko.html
She believes there is no word in Japanese for "racial profiling". Two days ago I spent 10 minutes explaining the term "affirmative action". One of the missions of the Japanese education system seems to be to avoid such terms. I remember the Ministry of Education skimming an English textbook lesson based on gender issues in the film "The whale rider" so as not having students discussing the gender issues contained in the film. What kind of consciousness does have a Japanese person who can read western newspapers and engage in civil rights issues?
Saturday 8 May 2010
universal, particular, and singular
The decision to follow the lonely precedent provided by H. S. Macran, who translated the three "moments" of the Concept (Allgemeine, Besondere, Einzelne) as "universal, particular, and singular... p. xix
Monday 29 March 2010
Inestability of thought and word
The general line of reasoning Vygotsky employed in this respect grew out of his critique of theorists who assumed that the relationship between word and thought remains constant. In contrast to this, he began with the assumption that signs first emerge in social and individual action without their users' full understanding of their meaning or functional role. What then follows is a process of coming to understand the meaning and functional significance of the sign forms that one has been using all along. In an important sense human use signs before understaning what they are doing, or demonstrate' performance before competence,' as Courtney Cazden (1981) succinctly and elegantly put it.
Wertsch, 2007, p. 186.
Wertsch, 2007, p. 186.
Friday 26 March 2010
Why it takes longer to produce discourse under an elaborated code
An elaborated code will arise wherever the culture or subculture emphasizes the 'I' over the 'we'...Meanings which are discrete and local to the speaker must be cut so that they are intelligible to the listener, and this pressure forces upon the speaker to select both among syntactic alternatives and encourages differentiation of vocabulary.
Bernstein, 1971, p. 170.
Bernstein, 1971, p. 170.
Códigos elaborado y restringido y su relación con lo abstracto y lo concreto
...acerca de un par de cuestiones que mencioné en la charla en el CSIC: (a) sobre la diferencia del lexical probing entre conceptos cotidianos y conceptos científicos, referido a la charla de T. B. y en el simposio sobre (b) la cuestión de las emociones y el reconocimiento léxico, en la charla de G., en un estudio de Bernstein de 1962, llamado 'Linguistic codes, hesitation phenomena and intelligence', Bernstein prueba que en un sistema elaborado (por ejemplo el de cierto campo semántico de una disciplina en particular, supongamos teología, historia o física cuántica) "the speech system requires more complex planning than in the case of a restricted code" (por ejemplo, el que está relacionado con los conceptos cotidianos: casa, cuchara, tenedor, juguetes, ángel de la guarda). En otras palabras, si uno debe producir actos de habla en un código elaborado y no se está citando a sí mismo, tiende a dudar (hesitate) más que si uno está produciendo actos de habla en un código restringido. Mi conjetura es que no sólo habrá más duda al hablar sino al reconocer el léxico también, especialmente si el léxico va empotrado en un enunciado concreto.
Ahora bien, la distinción abstracto-concreto sigue pareciéndome poco apropiada por cuanto lo importante no es cuán abstracto o concreto un término es sino si éste ha sido aprendido en un código restringido o en uno elaborado o si el léxico es producido o no según tal o cual código. Yo puedo decir (a) "ayer le recé a mi ángel de la guarda en el dormitorio porque me dio miedo la oscuridad", lo cual es muy de código restringido, y puedo decir (b) "El primer Concilio Vaticano confirmó que los ángeles son mensajeros de Dios, sin referirse específica ni necesariamente a su origen", ejemplo de código elaborado. Bernstein probó que los hablantes tardan más tiempo en producir un enunciado tipo (b) que uno tipo (a). Es el ángel de (a) tan abstracto como los ángeles de (b), pues sí. Pero ese no es el punto. De partida, un enunciado del tipo (b) puede requerir una estructura sintáctica más compleja, más alejada del habla coloquial, que quizá sea más difícil de reconocer.
En el código restringido, el contexto es ampliamente compartido por los hablantes. En el código elaborado, el contexto no es tan claro. De hecho, un enunciado es mucho más impredecible sintácticamente, según lo prueba Bernstein. Por último está el factor de confounding. Si hago un probing con "ángel", me puedo ir al ángel de la guarda, al ángel caído o a Ángel, que es el nombre de mi padre. En cambio si pongo "iridio", que es un término concreto, pero que no se usa en el lenguaje coloquial sino que suele ser parte de un código elaborado, no tengo muchas opciones. Puedo decir que mi cama está hecha de iridio, pero no tiene mucho sentido. Iridio es un término concreto, pero que no va a ser parte de un enunciado regido por un código restringido. A grandes rasgos y con algunas excepciones, unas palabras remiten a la infancia, otras a la juventud, sobre todo escolar, otras a la edad madura, universitaria y profesional, por ejemplo. Todas etapas en que aprendimos a hablar, escribir, escuchar y escribir de manera distinta.
Ahora bien, la distinción abstracto-concreto sigue pareciéndome poco apropiada por cuanto lo importante no es cuán abstracto o concreto un término es sino si éste ha sido aprendido en un código restringido o en uno elaborado o si el léxico es producido o no según tal o cual código. Yo puedo decir (a) "ayer le recé a mi ángel de la guarda en el dormitorio porque me dio miedo la oscuridad", lo cual es muy de código restringido, y puedo decir (b) "El primer Concilio Vaticano confirmó que los ángeles son mensajeros de Dios, sin referirse específica ni necesariamente a su origen", ejemplo de código elaborado. Bernstein probó que los hablantes tardan más tiempo en producir un enunciado tipo (b) que uno tipo (a). Es el ángel de (a) tan abstracto como los ángeles de (b), pues sí. Pero ese no es el punto. De partida, un enunciado del tipo (b) puede requerir una estructura sintáctica más compleja, más alejada del habla coloquial, que quizá sea más difícil de reconocer.
En el código restringido, el contexto es ampliamente compartido por los hablantes. En el código elaborado, el contexto no es tan claro. De hecho, un enunciado es mucho más impredecible sintácticamente, según lo prueba Bernstein. Por último está el factor de confounding. Si hago un probing con "ángel", me puedo ir al ángel de la guarda, al ángel caído o a Ángel, que es el nombre de mi padre. En cambio si pongo "iridio", que es un término concreto, pero que no se usa en el lenguaje coloquial sino que suele ser parte de un código elaborado, no tengo muchas opciones. Puedo decir que mi cama está hecha de iridio, pero no tiene mucho sentido. Iridio es un término concreto, pero que no va a ser parte de un enunciado regido por un código restringido. A grandes rasgos y con algunas excepciones, unas palabras remiten a la infancia, otras a la juventud, sobre todo escolar, otras a la edad madura, universitaria y profesional, por ejemplo. Todas etapas en que aprendimos a hablar, escribir, escuchar y escribir de manera distinta.
Wednesday 10 February 2010
Contradiction in L2 instruction
As far as language development is concerned, second or foreign language development is viewed as a metalinguistic process, not unlike the development of scientific concepts—which is sustained on the development of everyday concepts—, since the semantic system of the native language mediates the acquisition of concepts in the second language. What needs to be internalised is the psychological structure of the target language, that is, as Gal’perin (1992d) asserts, the ‘circumstances of speech’ (pp. 82-83). Thus, second or foreign language instruction presents a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, it relies on the acquirer’s native language (and presumably on highly coded methods of instruction) but, on the other hand, in order to bring the psychological structure of the utterance in the foreign language as close as possible to that which operates in the native language, acquirers are required to create links between linguistic functions in the mother and target language within recognisable communicative contexts. Those contexts, for the most part, are socio-communicative and rely, for their transmission, upon naturalistic instructional methods. Instruction in those context demands the communication readiness observed in operationalised functions. In consequence, instruction has to provide for pedagogical moves that go from meaning to sense within a contextual naturalistic platform set from sense to meaning. The weak and strong versions in communicative language teaching (CLT) reflect this dialectical contradiction.
Saturday 6 February 2010
Faith and reason again, hermeneutics and faith
The hermeneutic of the Holy Scriptures, because of its polysemous nature, constitutes a labyrinth, an ocean or flow of divine discourse. The only way out, the only north in this ocean is faith. Faith is ultimately what gives final sense to any interpretation. But faith is a sense, an spontaneous feeling that does not emerge from the act of knowing something empirically opposed to the theoretical. Faith is experience, but an experience that emerges spontaneously, not subject to the taming of abstract concepts that can only be understood as part of a network of theoretical concepts. In fact, a sure way to eventually kill a feeling is by rationalising it through words (psychoanalysis is used to kill a phobia).
As Eco points out:
"...the moral sense can be understood only through the mediation of the allegorical one, and is attainable only by the faithful ones...which can be summarized through the line of Nicholas of Lyra: Littera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria, moralia quid agas, quo tendas anagogia". (Eco, 1984, p. 149)
In a similar way, in the Zen tradition, it is only the experience through practical means what gives the correct interpretation of the scriptures. The understanding of the scriptures is done through practical action. The scriptures serve to inform the formal aspects of the practice but they are not "principles" from which practice can be deduced, as it is the case with western law and western ethics. In other words, it is not possible to understand the koan from a pure rational stance. As master Dogen said, "awakening awakens awakening" or, akawening is only awakened by the force of awakening" or "Buddha alone knows Buddha".
As Eco points out:
"...the moral sense can be understood only through the mediation of the allegorical one, and is attainable only by the faithful ones...which can be summarized through the line of Nicholas of Lyra: Littera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria, moralia quid agas, quo tendas anagogia". (Eco, 1984, p. 149)
In a similar way, in the Zen tradition, it is only the experience through practical means what gives the correct interpretation of the scriptures. The understanding of the scriptures is done through practical action. The scriptures serve to inform the formal aspects of the practice but they are not "principles" from which practice can be deduced, as it is the case with western law and western ethics. In other words, it is not possible to understand the koan from a pure rational stance. As master Dogen said, "awakening awakens awakening" or, akawening is only awakened by the force of awakening" or "Buddha alone knows Buddha".
Monday 25 January 2010
'Gaze' and specialised knowledge
I believe 'gaze' was first introduced by Foucault in 'The Birth of the Clinic' (1973) where it referred to the 'medical gaze' which transformed the body into a positivists object. That specialised knowledge selected and constructed a particular object, on the basis of recognition and realisation procedures internal to the specialisation of that knowledge.
Bernstein, 2000, p. 172.
Bernstein, 2000, p. 172.
Saturday 23 January 2010
Abstraction and speech
Whilst the existence of inner, non-linguistic categories that enable concept formation is not denied, according to Gal’perin (1969), ‘abstractions are achieved only as a result of speech and are retained only in speech’ (p. 262)
Monday 18 January 2010
The neurons that shaped civilization
Neuroscientist Vilayanur Ramachandran outlines the fascinating functions of mirror neurons. Only recently discovered, these neurons allow us to learn complex social behaviors, some of which formed the foundations of human civilization as we know it.
Saturday 16 January 2010
Technocratic speech and technocratic consciousness
We do not speak in a spontaneous, everyday speech but in a speech that has gone through the matrix of formal education. In the past, our speech was modelled by the primary and secondary schooling (mathematics, geometry, physics, chemistry, literature, including poetry and drama). Nowadays, however, that knowledge is topped by other academic disciplines. I am thinking about science (including environmental sciences, medicine, evolutionary science), technology, the social sciences in general (especially politics), history and, since Freud, psychology.
A year ago I read 'Saturday' by Ian McEwan. The novel tells the story of two days in the life of Henry Perone, an English neurosurgeon whose life is dramatically changed in the aftermath of 9/11. I was very impressed by its narrative, although for me, a Latin American, the exercise seemed too cold at times. Aesthetically, the novel presents a world in blue, like inside a bubble that can only be constructed by an English mind, the same collective mind that created the individual mind of Charles Darwin, the mind of the collector who realises a novel truth after putting the pieces of the puzzle together. It was extraordinarily precise, but at the same time absolutely contemporary.
The narrator created Perone with an evolutionary consciousness. It obviously reflects the fact that McEwan is completely sold to Darwin and evolutionary theory. The key here is that it would be impossible for a pre-Darwinian person to truly understand that novel. You simply do not understand it in its complexity if you don't get to know the basics of Darwinian thought. Moreover, the narrator appropriates the speech of brain surgeons with no compromises. One really believes Perone is what the narrator says he is. Life and death depend upon Perone's scientific knowledge and neurosurgery skills, as every human life on this planet depends upon the mastery of language and technology, from small or large-scale ways to co-ordinate work and provide food and shelter, to systems of representations that shape our identities and motivate the way we behave.
But at the end, the novel leaves you in a moody state. Blue. Longing for another more primitive world where gods exist.
What kind of identities are being shaped by our speech? Technocratic identities where the old languages of philosophy and religion are dead? Who are we nowadays? Who can understand us apart from ourselves?
A year ago I read 'Saturday' by Ian McEwan. The novel tells the story of two days in the life of Henry Perone, an English neurosurgeon whose life is dramatically changed in the aftermath of 9/11. I was very impressed by its narrative, although for me, a Latin American, the exercise seemed too cold at times. Aesthetically, the novel presents a world in blue, like inside a bubble that can only be constructed by an English mind, the same collective mind that created the individual mind of Charles Darwin, the mind of the collector who realises a novel truth after putting the pieces of the puzzle together. It was extraordinarily precise, but at the same time absolutely contemporary.
The narrator created Perone with an evolutionary consciousness. It obviously reflects the fact that McEwan is completely sold to Darwin and evolutionary theory. The key here is that it would be impossible for a pre-Darwinian person to truly understand that novel. You simply do not understand it in its complexity if you don't get to know the basics of Darwinian thought. Moreover, the narrator appropriates the speech of brain surgeons with no compromises. One really believes Perone is what the narrator says he is. Life and death depend upon Perone's scientific knowledge and neurosurgery skills, as every human life on this planet depends upon the mastery of language and technology, from small or large-scale ways to co-ordinate work and provide food and shelter, to systems of representations that shape our identities and motivate the way we behave.
But at the end, the novel leaves you in a moody state. Blue. Longing for another more primitive world where gods exist.
What kind of identities are being shaped by our speech? Technocratic identities where the old languages of philosophy and religion are dead? Who are we nowadays? Who can understand us apart from ourselves?
Saturday 9 January 2010
Moonwalking, imitating Michael Jackson
It's quite remarkable the role of pantomime in the developing of medieval literature noticed by Bakhtin in 'The dialogic imagination'.
I am not sure how to put it but there are many converging lines to explain the emergence and development of higher (and not so higher) psychological functions in history: the role of pantomime and theatre, for once. Or pantomime as the most primitive form of drama.
I cannot but see a connection between Shakespeare and the issue of his works citing stories and other works up to the point where we believe the Bard is a bodily representation of a collective author. The fact that his English is a sort of word salad that emerged in an England open to trade, people, products and languages from all over the world (a re-run of the Roman empire in steroids), without a fixed centre (soon they will even reject the 'Vulgata latina' and the canonical normative it imposed on vernacular languages).
How could we think of politics without theatre. Does politics imitate theatre or theatre imitates politics? And when national languages were fixed in their modern version, literature then imitated literature (starting by Cervantes). In its contemporary forms, people imitate life styles depicted in films, TV series and comedy. A former Chinese student of mine learned most of her English by watching 'Friends'. Of course she wants to imitate not only the way Rachel speaks but the way she lives and I think she eventually will manage to copycut her lifestyle: live in an apartment in New York and be a successful businessperson.
I remember some political observers noticing the Soviet Union fell not only as a consequence of the struggle between economic and political forces but because Russians were watching the American series 'Dallas' and were fascinated by America's way of living (not sure about this information though).
On an even more simplistic key, one can start to see a complete shift in American society when white kids tried to moonwalk like Michael Jackson. Perhaps without that cultural change fostered by the television industry (MTV), the rise of Obama to power would have not been possible in the US.
I am not sure how to put it but there are many converging lines to explain the emergence and development of higher (and not so higher) psychological functions in history: the role of pantomime and theatre, for once. Or pantomime as the most primitive form of drama.
I cannot but see a connection between Shakespeare and the issue of his works citing stories and other works up to the point where we believe the Bard is a bodily representation of a collective author. The fact that his English is a sort of word salad that emerged in an England open to trade, people, products and languages from all over the world (a re-run of the Roman empire in steroids), without a fixed centre (soon they will even reject the 'Vulgata latina' and the canonical normative it imposed on vernacular languages).
How could we think of politics without theatre. Does politics imitate theatre or theatre imitates politics? And when national languages were fixed in their modern version, literature then imitated literature (starting by Cervantes). In its contemporary forms, people imitate life styles depicted in films, TV series and comedy. A former Chinese student of mine learned most of her English by watching 'Friends'. Of course she wants to imitate not only the way Rachel speaks but the way she lives and I think she eventually will manage to copycut her lifestyle: live in an apartment in New York and be a successful businessperson.
I remember some political observers noticing the Soviet Union fell not only as a consequence of the struggle between economic and political forces but because Russians were watching the American series 'Dallas' and were fascinated by America's way of living (not sure about this information though).
On an even more simplistic key, one can start to see a complete shift in American society when white kids tried to moonwalk like Michael Jackson. Perhaps without that cultural change fostered by the television industry (MTV), the rise of Obama to power would have not been possible in the US.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
