Imitation and communication

Human cooperative communication emerged first in evolution (and emerges first in ontogeny) in the natural, spontaneous gestures of pointing and pantomiming. (Tomasello, 2008, p. 11)

Syntax/Semantics as a false dichotomy

The major opposition in language is thus not between formal syntax and semantics, but between a linguistic symbol and its communicative significance; signifier and signified, form and function, symbol and meaning. Within the signifier/form/symbol pole, we may then distinguish among different types of linguistic signs, for example, lexical, morphological, and phrasal. Within the signified/function/meaning pole, we may distinguish between semantic and pragmatic functions. But there are no linguistic structures that operate independent of meaning in the cognitive-functional account. (Tomasello, 1998, p. xi)

Imitation and development

…according to Vygotsky, imitation is the process through which socioculturally constructed forms of mediation are internalized… One of the earliest social scientist to propose imitation as a uniquely human form of development was James Mark Baldwin (1895/1915). For Baldwin, ‘imitation to the intelligent and earnest imitator is never slavish, never mere repetition; it is, on the contrary, a means for further ends, a method of absorbing what is present in others and of making it over in forms peculiar to one’s own genius’ (cited in Valsiner and van der Veer 2000: 153). Baldwin distinguished two forms of imitation, simple and persistent. Simple imitation is the best the individual can do and ‘does not include second attempts to improve the imitation’; thus the child continues to repeat the initial production without modification regardless of its similarity to the original model (ibid.). Persistent imitation, on the other hand, is intentional and goal-directed and entails cognitive activity; it is cyclic and reproductive in the sense that the individual continues to modify the reproduction in accordance with a mental image of the original (ibid.). Each reproductive cycle works on not on the original copy ‘but the previous imitation’ (ibid.). (Lantolf and Thorne, 2005, p. 166)

Cognitive and linguistic functions

Gal’perin (1992d) approaches the problem of language and thought from the standpoint of the problem of constructing speech in a foreign language. He introduces the notions of linguistic and cognitive consciousness. The latter is the product of cognition (a reflection) of things (through images) and it serves the purpose of guiding actions done with things. Sense organs and logical thinking serve as channels for this cognition. The basic characteristic of these images is veridicity, i.e., complete and clear reproduction of the features of objects in reflection. They are subject to a criterion of practice, i.e., ‘coordination between the actual results of a process and what was expected on the basis of the original ideas of things’. In contrast, linguistic consciousness is formed as a means for organising joint activity. Its purpose is not to accomplish a full reflection of reality but ‘[l]inguistic meanings are a reflection of the interests and conditions surrounding the communication of an idea (to other people)’ (p. 89).

Concepts before experience?

For Chomsky (1988, p.191), the word is given to us ready-made “every child learns it perfectly right away”. Chomsky argues that this can only mean that human nature gives us that concept for free. For Chomsky, we have the concepts even before we have the experience "we simply learn the label that goes with the preexisting concept” (ibid. p. 191). Vygotsky (1986) research on concept development precisely shows that this platonic view of language is problematic. Conceptual development is a long transformative process where biological maturation is qualitatively transformed into cultural development when it meets communication through artifacts, i.e. language. (Negueruela, 2003, p. 75)